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Abstract There is a persistent confusion about determinism and predictability.
In spite of the opinions of some eminent philosophers (e.g., Popper), it is possible
to understand that the two concepts are completely unrelated. In few words we
can say that determinism is ontic and has to do with how Nature behaves, while
predictability is epistemic and is related to what the human beings are able to
compute. An analysis of the Lyapunov exponents and the Kolmogorov-Sinai en-
tropy shows how deterministic chaos, although with an epistemic character, is non
subjective at all. This should clarify the role and content of stochastic models in
the description of the physical world.
1 Introduction
In the last decades scientists and philosophers showed an intense interest for chaos,
chance and predictability. Some aspects of such topics are rather subtle, and in
the literature is not unusual to find wrong statements. In particular it is important
to avoid confusion on the fact that to be deterministic (or stochastic) is an ontic
property of a system, i.e. related to its own nature independently of our knowledge;
while predictability, and somehow chaos, have an epistemic character, i.e. depend
on our knowledge. We will see how the introduction of a probabilistic approach
in deterministic chaotic systems, although with an epistemic character, is not
subjective.
Often in the past, the central goal of science has been though to be “prediction
and control”, we can mention von Neumann’s belief that powerful computers and
a clever use of numerical analysis would eventually lead to accurate forecasts, and
even to the control, of weather and climate:
The computer will enable us to divide the atmosphere at any moment into stable
regions and unstable regions. Stable regions we can predict. Unstable regions we
can control1.
The great scientist von Neumann was wrong, but he did not know the phe-
nomenon of deterministic chaos.
1Cited by Dyson (2009).
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About half a century ago, thanks to the contribution of M. He´non, E. Lorenz
and B. V. Chirikov (to cite just some of the most eminent scientists in the field),
deterministic chaos was (re)discovered. Such an event sure was scientifically im-
portant, e.g., as it clarifies topics like the different possible origins of the statistical
laws and the intrinsic practical limits of the predictions. On the other hand, one
has to admit that the term “deterministic chaos” can be seen as an oxymoron
and induced the persistence of a certain confusion about concepts as determin-
ism, predictability and stochastic laws. Our aim is to try to put some order into
this matter, discussing some aspects of deterministic chaos which, in our opin-
ion, are often misunderstood, leading to scientifically, as well as philosophically,
questionable and confused claims.
In spite of the fact that it is quite evident that Maxwell, Duhem, and Poincare´
understood in a clear way the distinction between determinism and chaos, in the
recent literature one can find a large spectrum of wrong statements on the concep-
tual impact of deterministic chaos, see Campbell and Garnett (1882). For instance,
Prigogine and Stengers (1994) claim that the notion of chaos leads us to rethink
the notion of “law of nature”. In a book on statistical physics (Vauclair 1993),
one can read that as consequence of chaos the deterministic approach fails. Sir
James Lightill (1986) in a lecture to the Royal Society on the 300th anniversary
of Newton’s Principia shows how to confuse determinism and prediction: We are
all deeply conscious today that the enthusiasm of our forebears for the marvelous
achievements of Newtonian mechanics led them to make generalization in this area
of predictability, which indeed we may generally have tended to believe before 1960,
but which we now recognize were false. We collectively wish to apologize for hav-
ing misled the generally educated public by spreading ideas about the determinism
of systems satisfying Newton’s laws of motion, that after 1960 were to be proved
incorrect.
Chaos presents both ontic and epistemic aspects2 which may generate confusion
about the real conceptual relevance of chaos. We shall see that chaos allows us
to unambiguously introduce probabilistic concepts in a deterministic world. Such
a possibility is not merely the consequence of our limited knowledge of the state
of the system of interest. Indeed, in order to account for this limited knowledge,
one usually relies on a coarse-grained description, which requires a probabilistic
approach. We will see that many important features of the dynamics do not
depend on the scale  of the graining, if it is fine enough. At the same time, many
results for the  → 0 limit do not apply to the cases with  = 0. Therefore, the
probabilistic description of chaotic systems reveals one more instance of singular
limits.
2We shall see how determinism refers to ontic descriptions, while predictability (and,
in some sense, chaos) has an epistemic nature.
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2 About determinism
The word determinism has often been used in fields other than physics, such as
psychology and sociology, causing some bewilderment. There have been some
misunderstandings about the meaning of determinism, and because, at times, de-
terminism has been improperly associated with reductionism, mechanicism and
predictability (Chibbaro, et al. 2014), it seems to us that a brief review of the
notion of determinism is not useless.
For example, unlike the majority of modern physicists and mathematicians,
by deterministic system Popper (1992) means a system governed by a determin-
istic evolution law, whose evolution can be in principle predicted with arbitrary
accuracy:
Scientific determinism is the doctrine that the state of any closed physical sys-
tem at any future instant can be predicted.
In other words, Popper confuses determinism and prediction.
On the contrary, Russell gives the following definition, which is in agreement
with the present mathematical terminology:
A system is said to be “deterministic” when, given certain data e1, e2, ..., en
at times t1, t2, ..., tn, respectively, concerning this system, if Et is the state of the
system at any (later) time t, there is a functional relation of the form
Et = f(e1, t1, e2, t2, ..., en, tn) .
In the definition of Russell practical prediction is not mentioned.
The confusion about determinism and predictability is not isolated, see, e.g.,
Stone (1989) and Boyd (1972) who examine in great detail arguments about the
widespread opinion that human behavior is not deterministic because it is not
predictable.
Determinism amounts to the metaphysical doctrine that same events always
follow from same antecedents. But, as Maxwell had already pointed out in 1873, it
is impossible to confirm this fact, because nobody has ever experienced the same
situation twice:
It is a metaphysical doctrine that from the same antecedents follow the same
consequences. No one can gainsay this. But it is not of much use in a world like
this, in which the same antecedents never again concur, and nothing ever happens
twice ... The physical axiom which has a somewhat similar aspect is “that from like
antecedents follow like consequences”. But here we have passed ... from absolute
accuracy to a more or less rough approximation.
In these few lines, Maxwell touches on issues which will be later investigated,
and anticipates their solution. The issues are:
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1. the impossibility of proving (or refuting) the deterministic character of the
laws of Nature;
2. the practical impossibility of making long-term predictions for a class of
phenomena, referred to here as chaotic, despite their deterministic nature.
After the development of quantum mechanics, many think that discussing the
deterministic nature of the laws of physics is too academic an exercise to deserve
serious consideration. For instance, in a speech motivated by the heated con-
troversy on chaos and determinism between philosophers and scientists, Kampen
(1991) bluntly said that the problem does not exist, as it is possible to show that:
the ontological determinism a` la Laplace can neither be proved nor disproved
on the basis of observations3.
It is not difficult to realize that determinism and predictability constitute two
quite distinct issues, and the former does not imply the latter. Roughly speaking,
determinism can be traced back to a vision of the nature of causality and can
be cast in mathematical terms, by saying that the laws of nature are expressed
by ordinary (or partial) differential equations. However, as noted by Maxwell,
the objectively ontological determinism of the laws of nature cannot be proven;
but one might find it convenient to use deterministic descriptions. Moreover,
even at a macroscopic level, many phenomena are chaotic and, in some sense, ap-
pear to be “random”. On the other hand, the microscopic phenomena described
by quantum mechanics, fall directly within a probabilistic framework. When re-
ferring to observable properties, they appear ontologically and epistemologically
non-deterministic.
3 Two explicit examples
In order to clarify the concepts of determinism, predictability and chaos let us
discuss two deterministic systems whose behaviors are rather different. They do
not have particular own relevance, their choice is motivated just for pedagogical
reasons:
Example A The pendulum (of length L):
d2θ
dt2
= − g
L
sin θ . (1)
3In brief, van Kampens argument is the following. Suppose the existence of a world A
which is not deterministic and consider a second world B obtained from the first using the
following deterministic rule: every event in B is the copy of an event occurred one million
years earlier in A. Therefore, all the observers in B and their prototypes live the same
experiences despite the different natures of the two worlds.
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According to well known mathematical theorems on differential equations the fol-
lowing results hold:
a) the initial condition (θ(0), dθ(0)/dt) determines in a unique way the state of the
system (θ(t), dθ(t)/dt) at any time t, in other words the system is deterministic;
b) the motion is periodic, i.e., there exists a time T (depending on the initial
conditions) such that(
θ(t+ T ),
dθ(t+ T )
dt
)
=
(
θ(t),
dθ(t)
dt
)
;
c) the time evolution can be expressed via a function F (t, θ(0), dθ(0)/dt):
θ(t) = F
(
t, θ(0),
dθ(0)
dt
)
.
The function F can be explicitly written only if θ(0) and dθ(0)/dt are small (and,
in such a case, T = 2pi
√
L/g is a constant, independent of the initial conditions);
however, in the generic case, F can be easily determined with the desired precision.
Example B Bernoulli’s shift:
xt+1 = 2xt mod 1 . (2)
Where the operation mod 1 corresponds to taking the fractional part of a number,
e.g., 1.473 mod 1 = 0.473. It is easy to understand that the above system is
deterministic: x0 determines x1, which determines x2 and so on. Let us show that
the above system is chaotic: a small error in the initial conditions doubles at every
step. Suppose that x0 is a real number in the interval [0, 1], it can be expressed
by an infinite sequence of 0 and 1:
x0 =
a1
2
+
a2
4
+ ...+
an
2n
+ ...,
where every an takes either the value 0 or the value 1. The above binary notation
allows us to determine the time evolution by means of a very simple rule: at every
step, one has just move the “binary point” of the binary expansion of x0 by one
position to the right and eliminate the integer part. For example, take
x0 = 0.11010000101110101010101100.....
x1 = 0.1010000101110101010101100.......
x2 = 0.010000101110101010101100.........
x3 = 0.10000101110101010101100...........
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and so on. In terms of the sequence {a1, a2, ...}, it becomes quite clear how crucially
the temporal evolution depends on the initial condition. Let us consider two initial
conditions x
(1)
0 and x
(2)
0 such that |x(1)0 − x(2)0 | < 2−M for some arbitrary (large)
integer number M , this means that x
(1)
0 and x
(2)
0 have the first M binary digits
identical, and they may differ only afterwards. The above discussion shows that the
distance between the points increases rapidly: for t < M one has an exponential
growth of the distance between the two trajectories
|x(1)t − x(2)t | ∼ |x(1)0 − x(2)0 | 2t .
As soon as t > M , one can only conclude that |x(1)t − x(2)t | < 1. Our system is
chaotic: even an arbitrarily small error in the initial conditions eventually domi-
nates the dynamics of the system, making long-term prediction impossible.
From the above discussion we saw how in deterministic systems one can have
the following possible cases (in decreasing order of predictability):
I- Explicit possibility to determine the future (pendulum in the limit of small os-
cillations);
II- Good control of the prediction, without an explicit solution (pendulum with
large oscillations);
III- Chaos and practical impossibility of predictability (Bernoulli’s shift).
3.1 About the ontic/epistemic character of chaos
One should also beware of the possible confusion between ontic and epistemic de-
scriptions, when studying the topic of chaos. Determinism simply means that:
given the same initial state X(0), one always finds the same evolved state X(t),
at any later time t > 0. Therefore, determinism refers exclusively to ontic de-
scriptions, and it does not deal with prediction. This has been clearly stressed
by Atmanspacher (2002), in a paper by the rather eloquent title Determinism is
ontic, determinability is epistemic. This distinction between ontic and epistemic
descriptions was obvious to Maxwell; after having noted the metaphysical nature
of the problem of determinism in physics, he stated that:
There are certain classes of phenomena ... in which a small error in the data
only introduces a small error in the result ... There are other classes of phenomena
which are more complicated, and in which cases of instability may occur.
Also for Poincare´ the distinction between determinism and prediction was
rather clear, on the contrary, Popper (1992) confused determinism and predic-
tion.
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4 Chaos and asymptotics
Here, we briefly recall the essential properties of a deterministic chaotic system:
I- The evolution is given by a deterministic rule, for example, by a set of differential
equations;
II- Solutions sensitively depend on the initial conditions: i.e., two initially almost
identical states X(0) and X′(0), with a very small initial displacement |X′(0) −
X(0)| = δ0, become separated at an exponential rate:
|X′(t)−X(t)| = δt ∼ δ0 eλt , (3)
where λ is positive and is called the Lyapunov exponent, for Bernoulli’s shift
λ = ln 2;
III- The evolution of the state X(t) is not periodic and appears quite irregular,
similar in many respects to that of random systems.
The sensitive dependence on the initial condition drastically limits the possi-
bility of making predictions: if the initial state is known with a certain uncertainty
δ0, the evolution of the system can be accurately predicted with precision ∆ only
up to a time that depends on the Lyapunov exponent. This quantity is inherent
in the system and does not depend on our ability to determine the initial state;
hence, recalling Eq. (3), the time within which the error on the prediction does
not exceed the desired tolerance is:
Tp ∼ 1
λ
ln
∆
δ0
. (4)
The sensitivity to initial conditions introduces an error in predictions which grows
exponentially in time. As the Lyapunov exponent λ is an intrinsic characteristic
of the system, predictions remain meaningful only within a time given by Eq.
(4); therefore, it is well evident that a deterministic nature does not imply the
possibility of an arbitrarily accurate prediction.
Let us note that, since X is in a bounded domain, some accuracy is needed in
the definition of the Lyapunov exponent: before one has to take the limit δ0 → 0
and then t→∞:
λ = lim
t→∞ limδ0→0
1
t
ln
( δt
δ0
)
.
Another important characterisation of the dynamics is given by the Kolmogorov-
Sinai entropy, hKS , defined as follows. Just for the sake of simplicity we consider a
system with discrete time: let A = {A1, ..., AN} be a finite partition of the phase
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space (the space of configurations of a given system under study), made up of the
N disjoint sets Ai, and consider the sequence of points
{x1, ...,xn, ...} ,
which constitutes the trajectory with initial condition x0. This trajectory can be
associated with the symbol sequence
{i0, i1, ..., in, ...} , (5)
where ik = j if xk ∈ Aj .
Once a partition A has been introduced, the coarse-grained properties of
chaotic trajectories can be therefore studied through the discrete time sequence
(5). Let Cm = (i1, i2, ...im) be a “word” (a string of symbols) of length m and
probability P (Cm). The quantity
Hm =
∑
Cm
P (Cm) lnP (Cm) (6)
is called the block entropy of the m-sequences4. In the limit of infinitely long
sequences, the asymptotic entropy increment
hS(A) = lim
m→∞(Hm+1 −Hm)
is called the Shannon entropy, and in general depends on the partition A . Taking
the largest value over all possible partitions we obtain the so-called Kolmogorov-
Sinai entropy:
hKS = sup
A
hS(A) .
A more intuitive definition of hKS starts from the partition A made of a grid of
hypercubes with sides of length , and takes the following limit:
hKS = lim
→0
h() ,
where h() = hS(A).
Naively, one might consider chaos in deterministic systems to be illusory, just
a consequence of our observational limitations. Apparently, such a conclusion is
confirmed by the fact that important measures of the dynamical complexity, such
4Shannon (1948) showed that, once the probabilities P (Cm) are known, the entropy
(6) is the unique quantity which measures, under natural conditions, the surprise or in-
formation carried by {Cm}.
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as the Lyapunov exponent λ and the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy hKS , are defined
via finite, albeit arbitrarily high, resolutions. For instance, in the computation of
λ one considers two trajectories, which are initially very close |X(0)−X′(0)| = δ0
and diverge in time from each other. Similarly, hKS is computed introducing a
partition of the phase space, whose elementary cells have a finite size . However,
in the small- limit, h() asymptotically tends to a value (hKS) that no longer
depends on , as happens to λ in the small-δ0 limit. Therefore, λ and hKS can be
considered intrinsic properties of the dynamics themselves: they do not depend on
our observational ability, provided it is finite, i.e., provided  and δ0 do not vanish.
According to Primas (2002), measures of stability, such as the Lyapunov exponent,
concern ontic descriptions, whereas measures of information content or informa-
tion loss, such as the Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy, relate to epistemic descriptions.
We agree as far as stability is concerned. Regarding the epistemic character of
hKS , we observe that the Shannon entropy of a sequence of data, as well as the
Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy, enjoy an epistemic status from a certain viewpoint, but
not from another. The epistemic status arises from the fact that information the-
ory deals with transmission and reception of data, which is necessarily finite. On
the other hand, hKS is definitely an objective quantity, which does not depend on
our observational limitations, as demonstrated by the fact that it can be expressed
in terms of Lyapunov exponents (Cencini, et al. 2009). We note that the -entropy
h() can be introduced even for stochastic processes, therefore it is a concept which
links deterministic and stochastic descriptions.
5 Chaos and probability
After the (re)discovery of chaos in deterministic systems, owing to the presence of
irregular and unpredictable behaviours, it is quite natural to adopt a probabilistic
approach even in the deterministic realm. Let us assume that we known the
probability density of configurations in phase space at the initial time ρ(x, 0), it is
possible to write down its time evolution law:
ρ(x, 0)→ ρ(x, t) .
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Under certain conditions (mixing5) one has that al large time the probability
density approaches a function which does not depend on ρ(x, 0):
lim
t→∞ ρ(x, t) = ρ
inv(x) , (7)
and is therefore called the invariant probability density. For instance, for Bernoulli’s
shift one has the following recursive rule:
ρ(x, t+ 1) =
1
2
ρ
(x
2
, t
)
+
1
2
ρ
(
x
2
+
1
2
, t
)
,
and the invariant probability density is constant in the interval [0, 1]:
lim
t→∞ ρ(x, t) = ρ
inv(x) = 1 .
It is rather natural, from an epistemic point of view, to accept the above prob-
abilistic approach: the introduction of ρ(x, 0) can be seen as a necessity stemming
from the human practical impossibility to determine the initial condition. For in-
stance, in the case of Bernouilli’s shift, knowing that the initial condition x(0) is in
interval [x∗, x∗+∆], it is natural to assume that ρ(x, 0) = 1/∆ for x ∈ [x∗, x∗+∆],
and 0 otherwise.
For t large enough (roughly t > t∗ ∼ ln(1/∆)) one has the convergence of ρ(x, t)
toward the invariant probability distribution. Let us note that such a feature holds
for any finite ∆, while t∗ weakly depends on ∆, therefore we can say that ρinv(x), as
well the approach to the invariant probability density, sure are objective properties
independent of the uncertainty ∆. Perhaps somebody could claim that, since it is
necessary to have ∆ 6= 0, the above properties, although objective, still have an
epistemic character. We do not insist further.
Figs. 1 and 2 show, in a rather transparent way, how the approach to the
ρinv(x) is rather fast and basically independent on the ρ(x, 0).
We saw how chaotic systems and, more precisely, those which are ergodic6,
naturally lead to probabilistic descriptions, even in the presence of deterministic
5The precise definition of mixing in dynamical systems requires several specifications
and technicalities. To have an idea, imagine to put flour and sugar, in a given proportion
(say 40% and 60%, respectively) and initially separated, in a jar with a lid. After shaking
the jar for a sufficiently long time, we expect the two components to be mixed, i.e., the
probability to find flour or sugar in every part of the jar matches the initial proportion of
the two components: a teaspoonful of the mixture taken at random will contain 40% of
flour and 60% of sugar.
6A very broad definition of an ergodic system relies on the identification of time av-
erages and averages computed with the invariant probability density (7). Said in other
words, a system is ergodic if its trajectory in phase space, during its time evolution, visits
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Figure 1: Probability density ρ(x, t) for Bernoulli’s shift. The distribution is
obtained generating at random 100000 points, uniformly distributed in the interval
[0.1 : 0.2] (a) and [0.4 : 0.55] (b), and then iterating the dynamics of each point
for 14 time steps. The red curves correspond to the initial distribution, the green,
the blue, and the magenta curves correspond to one, two and three time steps,
respectively. As it is evident, at each time step the dynamics initially doubles the
width of interval over which the points are distributed, until ρ(x, t) ≈ ρinv(x) = 1.
The light blue curves are obtained after 14 iterations: The probability density
ρ(x, t) for t > 12 is close to the invariant distribution ρinv(x) independently of the
initial ρ(x, 0).
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dynamics. In particular, ergodic theory justifies the frequentist interpretation of
probability, according to which the probability of a given event is defined by its
relative frequency. Therefore, assuming ergodicity, it is possible to obtain an em-
pirical notion of probability which is an objective property of the trajectory (von
Plato 1994). There is no universal agreement on this issue; for instance, Popper
(2002) believed that probabilistic concepts are extraneous to a deterministic de-
scription of the world, while Einstein held the opposite view, as expressed in his
letter to Popper:
I do not believe that you are right in your thesis that it is impossible to de-
rive statistical conclusions from a deterministic theory. Only think of classical
statistical mechanics (gas theory, or the theory of Brownian movement).
6 A brief digression on models in physics
At this point of the discussion, we wish to recall that our description of physical
phenomena is necessarely based upon models7, that entail a schematization of a
specified portion of the physical world. Take for instance the pendulum described
by Eq. (1). The mathematical object introduced thereby relates to a physical
pendulum under some specific assumptions. For instance, the string of length L,
that connects the swinging body to a suspension point, is assumed to be inexten-
sible, whereas any physical string is (to some extent) extensible. The model also
assumes that gravity is spatially uniform and does not change with time, i.e., it
can be described by a constant g. Eq. (1) will therefore reasonably describe a
physical pendulum only inasmuch as the variations of L and/or g are sufficiently
small, so as to add only tiny corrections. Even more important, there is not in
the physical world such an object as an isolated pendulum, whereas Eq. (1) to-
tally ignores the physical world around the pendulum (the only ingredients being
gravity, the string, and the suspension point). Galileo Galilei was well aware of
this subtlety when comparing the prediction of our mathematical models with the
(and densely explores) all the accessible regions of phase space, so that the time spent in
each region is proportional to the invariant probability density assigned to that region.
Therefore, if a system is ergodic, one can understand its statistical features looking at
the time evolution for a sufficient long time; the conceptual and technical relevance of
ergodicity is quite clear.
7There are several definitions of a Model, but to our purposes the following is a reason-
able one: Given any system S, by which we mean a set of objects connected by certain
relations, the system M is said a model of S if a correspondence can be established be-
tween the elements (and the relations) ofM and the elements (and the relations) of S, by
means of which the study of S is reduced to the study ofM, within certain limitations to
be specified or determined.
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physical phenomena they aim to describe8 and called accidents (on this topic, see,
e.g., Koertge, 1977) all external influences apt to modify, often in an apparently
unpredictable way, the behaviour of a (supposedly isolated) portion of the physical
world. In the case of the Eq. (1), we are, e.g., neglecting the fact that a real pen-
dulum swings in a viscous medium (the air), and also experiences some friction at
the suspension point. These effects gradually alter the motion of the pendulum,
which is no longer periodic and eventually stops. Eq. (1) also neglects the fact
that the Earth is not an inertial reference frame: it rotates around its axis and
around the Sun. The first effect is far more important and gives rise to the grad-
ual but sizable variation of the plane of oscillation (Foucault’s pendulum). There
are several external influences that may alter the motion of a pendulum. Some
of them may be accounted for, at least to some extent, by simple modifications
of Eq. (1). Other are rather complicated and are not easily accountable. Thus,
Eq. (1) describes a pendulum only as far and as long as external influences do not
alter significantly its motion. Said in other words, it describes a pendulum under
controlled conditions.
7 The old dilemma determinism/stochasticity
The above premise underlines the crucial importance of the concept of state of the
system, i.e., in mathematical terms, the variables which describe the phenomenon
under investigation. The relevance of such an aspect is often underestimated; only
in few situations, e.g., in mechanical systems, it is easy to identify the variables
which describe the phenomenon. On the contrary, in a generic case, there are
serious difficulties; we can say that often the main effort in building a theory
of nontrivial phenomena concerns the identification of the appropriate variables.
Such a difficulty is well known in statistical physics; it has been stressed, e.g., by
Onsager and Machlup (1953) in their seminal work on fluctuations and irreversible
processes, with the caveat:
8Experiments are usually carried out under controlled conditions, meaning that every
possible care is taken in order to exclude external influences and focus on specific aspects
of the physical world. In his “Dialogues concerning two new sciences”, Galilei (English
translation, 1914) describes the special care to be taken in order to keep the accidents
under control: “... I have attempted in the following manner to assure myself that the
acceleration actually experienced by falling bodies is that above described. A piece of
wooden moulding or scantling, about 12 cubits long, half a cubit wide, and three finger-
breadths thick, was taken; on its edge was cut a channel a little more than one finger in
breadth; having made this groove very straight, smooth, and polished, and having lined it
with parchment, also as smooth and polished as possible, we rolled along it a hard, smooth,
and very round bronze ball ...” (the italicized emphases are ours).
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how do you know you have taken enough variables, for it to be Markovian?
In a similar way, Ma (1985) notes that:
the hidden worry of thermodynamics is: we do not know how many coordinates
or forces are necessary to completely specify an equilibrium state.
Unfortunately, we have no definite method for selecting the proper variables.
Takens (1981) showed that from the study of a time series {u1, u2, ..., um},
where u is an observable sampled at the discrete times tj = j∆t and uj = u(tj),
it is possible (if we know that the system is deterministic and is described by a
finite dimensional vector) to determine the proper variable X. Unfortunately the
method has rather severe limitations:
a) It works only if we know a priori that the system is deterministic;
b) The protocol fails if the dimension of the attractor9 is large enough (say more
than 5 or 6).
Therefore the method cannot be used, apart for special cases (with a small dimen-
sion), to build up a model from the data.
We already considered arguments, e.g., by van Kampen, which deny that de-
terminism may be decided on the basis of observations. This conclusion is also
reached from detailed analyses of sequences of data produced by the time evo-
lutions of interest. In few words: the distinction between deterministic chaotic
systems and genuine stochastic processes is possible if one is able to reach arbi-
trary precision on the state of the system.
Computing the so-called -entropy h(), at different resolution scales , at least
in principle, one can distinguish potentially underlying deterministic dynamics
from stochastic ones.
From a mathematical point of view the scenario is quite simple: for a deter-
ministic chaotic system as  → 0 one has h() → hKS < ∞, while for stochastic
processes h() → ∞10. On the other hand an arbitrary solution is not possible,
therefore the analysis of temporal series can only be used, at best, to pragmatically
classify the stochastic or chaotic character of the observed signal, within certain
scales (Cencini, et al., 2009; Franceschelli, 2012). At first, this could be disturbing:
not even the most sophisticated time-series analysis that we could perform reveals
the “true nature” of the system under investigation, the reason simply being the
unavoidable finiteness of the resolution we can achieve.
On the other hand, one may be satisfied with a non-metaphysical point of
view, in which the true nature of the object under investigation is not at stake.
9The attractor of a dynamical system is a manifold in phase space toward which the
system tends to evolve, regardless of the initial conditions. Once close enough to the
attractor, the trajectory remains close to it even in the presence of small perturbations.
10Typically h() ∼ −α where the value of α depends on the process under investigation
(Cencini, et al., 2009).
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The advantage is that one may choose whatever model is more appropriate or
convenient to describe the phenomenon of interest, especially considering the fact
that, in practice, one observes (and wishes to account for) only a limited set of
coarse-grained properties.
In light of our arguments, it seems fair to claim that the vexed question of whether
the laws of physics are deterministic or probabilistic has, and will have, no defini-
tive answer. On the sole basis of empirical observations, it does not appear possible
to decide between these two contrasting arguments:
(i) Laws governing the Universe are inherently random, and the determinism that
is believed to be observed is in fact a result of the probabilistic nature implied by
the large number of degrees of freedom;
(ii) The fundamental laws are deterministic, and seemingly random phenomena
appear so due to deterministic chaos.
Basically these two positions can be viewed as a reformulation of the endless
debate on quantum mechanics: thesis (i) expresses the inherent indeterminacy
claimed by the Copenhagen school, whereas thesis (ii) illustrates the hidden de-
terminism advocated by Einstein (Pais 2005).
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